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Background
This is a collaborative submission from a group of academics based in the UK with expertise in information 
technology law and related areas. The preparation of this response has been funded by the Information 
Technology Think Tank, which is supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and led by the 
SCRIPT/AHRC Centre for Research in Intellectual Property and Technology, University of Edinburgh.
This response has been prepared by Ms Judith Rauhofer and Dr Christopher Marsden, University of Essex. 
Important contributions to preparing the response were also made by Dr Ian Brown, Oxford Internet Institute, 
University of Oxford and Professor Burkhard Schafer, University of Edinburgh. In addition, this response is 
submitted by the following individuals: Dr Abbe Brown, SCRIPT, University of Edinburgh, and Professor 
Abdul Paliwala, University of Warwick
Questions and Responses
Questions 1 to 9
No response is provided to questions Q1 to Q9.
Minimum quality of service (Network Neutrality)
Although the consultation document does not seek views in relation to the government’s plans for the 
establishment of a minimum service requirement under Article 22(3) of the Universal Service Directive, the 
authors would like to raise the following issues.
In paragraph 188 of the consultation document, the government states that it proposes;
‘to implement the changes to Article 22(3) [Universal Service Directive] through a minor amendment to 
the Communications Act to give Ofcom the necessary power [to impose minimum quality of service obligations 
on electronic communications network and service providers]. On 24 June 2010, Ofcom published a 
consultation document on traffic management, where it states that its likely initial view would be to explore 
existing competition tools and consumer transparency options before considering using these powers. Ofcom’s 
consultation closed on 9th September 2010’. [4]
BIS has publicly stated that issues concerning the open Internet and network neutrality are too broad-ranging 
and politically important to be left to the regulator. The Minister has recently affirmed, corrected and 
reaffirmed his commitment to an open Internet, and claimed to agree with Sir Tim Berners Lee on the 
centrality of network neutrality to freedom of expression and Internet innovation. [5] The Impact Assessment 
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and overall Framework fails to consider the need for ex ante provisions beyond competition powers and 
consumer transparency, simply stating a binary 0 or 1 option. At p. 99 of the Impact Assessment, it is stated 
that:
‘[c]urrently consumers are not always provided with all the information about terms and conditions and the 
quality of service they can expect, or are provided with the information in a way that is not user friendly, when 
making decisions and they may therefore make sub-optimal decisions.’
However, the remedy to this is only considered in relation to disabled users, though logically one can extend 
the chosen path with that for general users: ‘Ofcom is likely to consider using existing competition tools and 
consumer transparency options before considering using this power.’ [6]
Option 2, to extend powers to provide a further set of potential tools for intervention, should have been 
considered, as the French regulator, Autorité de Régulation des Communications Électroniques et des 
Postes (ARCEP) has done with its ‘Ten Network Neutrality Principles’ under the proposed French 
intervention. [7] [8] The fact that BIS and Ofcom do not yet agree with such a policy does not mean excluding 
an Option 2 from the Impact Assessment. Not to consider a further alternative is poor Impact Assessment 
practice.
Questions 10
No response.
Questions 11 and 12
No response is provided to Q11 and Q12.
Breach of Personal Data and Penalties
Question 12
We welcome suggestions as to how the provisions of the Directive could be better enforced.
The enforcement of data controllers’ compliance with the EU data protection framework has long been 
blighted by the lack of an effective enforcement regime. This has been recognised by the European 
Commission on many occasions, most recently in the Commission’s Communication ‘A comprehensive 
approach on personal data protection in the European Union’. [9] As a result, the need to provide ‘a stronger 
institutional arrangement for the effective enforcement of data protection rules’ and to make ‘remedies and 
sanctions more effective’ constitute two of the core challenges faced by the European Commission when 
reviewing the provisions of the 1995 Data Protection Directive.
Similar considerations informed the inclusion of a new Article 15a(1) in the revised ePrivacy Directive which 
requires member states to adopt rules on ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ penalties, including 
criminal sanctions where appropriate, for infringements of national data protection provisions, and to take all 
measures necessary to ensure that those penalties are implemented.
The recent expansion of the Information Commissioner’s enforcement powers which were introduced 
through the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008 and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 are likely to 
go some way towards achieving that objective. In particular, the Information Commissioner’s power under 
section 55A of the Data Protection Act 1998 to impose a fine of up to £500,000 for serious contraventions of 
the Act, is likely to deter many small to medium enterprises that act as data controllers and for whom such a 
fine would have a noticeable impact on profit. However, it is questionable whether even a fine of £500,000 
may act as a sufficient deterrent for large multinational companies where the cost of compliance with data 
protection requirements may exceed the potential value of a fine. Better deterrents may have to be put in 
place in relation to this type of data controller.
A decision by the Home Secretary to exercise her power under section 77 of the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008 to issue secondary legislation to introduce custodial sentences of up to 12 months on 
summary conviction, and up to two years imprisonment for a conviction on indictment for those involved in 
the illegal trade of personal information may also contribute to improved compliance with the data protection 
framework. The threat of custodial sentences often serves to ‘concentrate the CEOs mind’ and the 
introduction of such sentences may therefore motivate the company officers which may be liable under the 
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relevant provisions to put in place more effective procedures for compliance with data protection 
requirements. However, in view of the government’s plans to reduce the prison population and to limit the 
use of custodial sentences as much as possible, it is at least questionable whether the adoption of criminal 
sanctions is desirable from a public policy point of view.
It would therefore be useful to consider other types of sanctions directed, among other things, at the way in 
which violations of the framework are policed, the way in which they are publicized and the way in which 
company officers are incentivised to ensure compliance by their company.
Policing of violations
Currently, the Information Commissioner may only serve an assessment notice under section 41A(2) of 
the Data Protection Act 1998 on government departments or on a public authority or a person of a 
description specifically designated for that purposes. As part of the notice, the Information Commissioner can 
impose a requirement on the data controller to submit to a compulsory audit. This permits him, among other 
things, to enter specified premises at little or no notice. The majority of private data controllers are currently 
exempt from this provision which considerably affects the Information Commissioner’s ability to carry out 
unannounced audits of those private controllers data processing activities where he suspects a breach of 
any of the provisions of the Act. The government should therefore consider to expand the Information 
Commissioner’s powers under section 41A(2) of the Act to private data controllers. Such an expansion of 
powers should be accompanied by an increase in funding for the Information Commissioner to ensure that 
the Commissioner can carry out his obligations adequately and effectively.
Notification of data security breaches
Article 4(3) of the ePrivacy Directive as revised requires member states to ensure that certain data 
controllers must notify a personal data breach to the competent national authority (and, where appropriate to 
the data subjects affected by the breach) without undue delay. As set out in the Impact Assessment, the 
notification of data breaches is designed to provide consumers with information about which service 
providers have suffered breaches, so they are able to make informed decisions when deciding to whom to 
give personal data.
At the moment, the notification requirement is limited to providers of publicly available communications 
services. The effectiveness of this notification regime should be kept under review. If it proves effective, the 
UK government should advocate the extension of the requirement to all other data controllers in the context 
of the upcoming review of the 1995 Data Protection Directive. In this context that Information 
Commissioner’s office should be encouraged to collect the necessary statistical information that will enable 
the government to compare the effectiveness of the new system in accordance with a number of pre-agreed 
indicators.
Incentivising company officers
It is widely accepted in professions that the threat of losing the right to practice or be commercially active in 
that profession acts as a strong incentive to comply with the rules of conduct of that profession. In addition, in 
the context of company law, various provisions of the Company Directors Disqualification 1986 provide for 
the disqualification of a company director in cases where he is convicted of an indictable offence, where 
there has been a persistent breach of the company’s obligation to comply with provisions of the companies 
legislation requiring any return, account or other document to be filed with Companies House, or where the 
director is seen as unfit to lead a company for other reasons. The government should consider whether 
provisions should be introduced which allow for the disqualification of a company director if the company is 
found to have been in serious or persistent breach of any of the provisions of the Data Protection Act 1998.
Alternatively, the government could introduce an obligation on companies to include a statement that it has 
complied with its obligations under the Act as part of its annual return under companies legislation. Such a 
statement should be based on an annual internal audit of the company’s data processing activities. Any 
breach of this obligation may result in the disqualification of the director responsible under section 3(1) of the 
1986 Act. This approach would not only strengthen enforcement, it would also encourage companies publicly 
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to take responsibility for their data processing activities. It would also complement an approach recently 
suggested by the Article 29 Working Party that the revised Data Protection Directive should include a new 
‘accountability principle’.[10]
Cookies
Question 13
We welcome views on our proposed approach to implement the amendments to the Directive in relation to 
cookies by way of copying out the Directive text.
While the implementation of the amendments to the Directive by way of copying out the Directive text would 
ensure the UK’s compliance with its obligations under EU law, the text in question is ambiguous and open to 
a variety of interpretations. Many of the industry standards to be developed in this area will depend on the 
guidance provided by relevant data protection authorities. The Impact Assessment seems to suggest that the 
UK government expects much of this guidance to be developed by the Information Commissioner’s Office 
which, the government concludes, should be given ‘the flexibility to adjust to changes in usage and 
technology’. [11] However, if interpretation of the relevant provisions is left to the national regulator, it is likely 
that national regulators in different EU member states will exercise their discretion in different ways. Given 
the global nature of the electronic communications market such an approach is therefore bound to create a 
number of practical problems for data subjects as well as online providers.
Protection of individuals’ privacy
Although the ePrivacy Directive is generally viewed as forming part of the EU’s data protection framework 
designed to protect the personal information of data subjects, the provisions of that Directive that regulate 
the use of cookies are unique insofar as they do not depend on the assumption that cookies themselves, or 
the information they collect, necessarily constitute ‘personal data’ as defined in Article 2(a) of the 1995 Data 
Protection Directive. [12] This reflects the widely accepted view that:
a. while cookies and/or the information they transmit may not be able to identify a living individual on 
their own, they may well be able to do so in combination with other information held by the recipient 
of the transmitted information or a third party. This is particularly true in the case of ‘first party 
cookies’ which are commonly used by online providers for session management, personalisation and 
recognition purposes where the information transmitted by the cookie is later combined with the 
personal information the internet user has provided to the provider in the course of a sale or other 
contact.
b. the use of anonymous cookies by the website owner or by online advertising companies (‘third party 
cookies’) for the purpose of tracking an internet user’s personal browsing habits can still affect 
individual user’s rights if the information gathered about the user allows for the potential identification 
of the user through ever more sophisticated systems of profiling and data mining. [13]
c. online behavioural data generated by individual users and collected and mined by online providers 
and online advertising networks may cause economic harm to the user in question despite the fact 
that the user’s actual identity may never be ‘reverse engineered’. This may be the case, for example, 
if that behavioural data is used for the purpose of automated, dynamic pricing [14] where the price 
quoted to an individual user for certain goods or services is based on the provider’s expectation of 
the amount that user is willing or able to pay. Such pricing is likely to be discriminatory if the 
individual user has no means to discover that the price quoted to him is different from that quoted to 
another internet user.
The government’s statement that ‘cookies are not dangerous’ therefore ignores the increasingly intrusive 
nature of cookies that comes from recent improvements in data mining and profiling technologies and the 
extent to which businesses are beginning to use the data collected by cookies as the basis for new and in 
some cases exploitative or discriminatory revenue generation strategies. [15] These practices need to be 
taken into account when a regulatory response to the use of cookies is developed. The government’s 
assessment that ‘intervention is needed to ensure consumers have optimal information when acting to 
ensure their privacy’ also overlooks that Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive in the form adopted in 2002 
already contains an obligation on providers to provide internet users with ‘clear and comprehensive 
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information’ about the purposes of storing cookies and other devices on the user’s equipment, and the user’s 
right to refuse. [16]
In practice, as the Article 29 Working Party pointed out in its recent Opinion on online behavioural 
advertising [17], only one of the four most popular commercial browsers rejects third party cookies by default. 
The majority of browsers are therefore set up to accept cookies unless the user makes a conscious decision 
to change those settings. The information that online providers give to internet users in order to comply with 
their information obligation under Article 5(3) reflects this reality. It usually consists of an acknowledgement in 
providers’ privacy policies that
• cookies are stored on the users’ equipment; and
• a more or less detailed description of how to change browser settings from the ‘accept cookies’ 
default to a ‘reject cookies’ setting. [18]
The government’s contention in the Impact Assessment, that following the introduction of the revised 
provision ‘users will be able to make informed changes to the browser settings to suit their individual privacy 
needs and should therefore feel more confident using the internet’ therefore ignores the fact that users are 
already able to make those changes based on the information provided to them now. The only practical 
change that the government’s proposal is likely to bring about is a change in the wording of the providers’ 
privacy policies. Where, currently, providers inform users on how to exercise their right to opt out of receiving 
cookies, under the government’s proposals, providers would most probably use their privacy policies to 
inform users of the browser’s likely default setting to accept cookies and to imply the users’ opt-in consent to 
those default settings.
The basic problem with this approach results from the fact that, as is widely recognised, internet users do 
not, as a rule:
• read privacy policies before using an online services. These policies are usually complex documents 
which users often find difficult to understand. Users also feel that as these policies are non-
negotiable, they have little to gain from familiarising themselves with their content if their decision to 
use the service in any case has already been made.
• make changes to the browser settings even where the way in which this is to be achieved is 
explained to the user in plain English. This is partly because of user inertia and partly because of a 
well-known propensity for accepting default settings of technology for fear of upsetting the 
functioning of that technology. The latter is particularly understandable in the case of cookie settings 
as most providers’ privacy policies make it abundantly clear that refusing cookies may result in a loss 
of functionality of the online service.
It is true, as the Impact Assessment points out, that an increase in users who block cookies may result in a 
loss of revenue generated by behavioural and interest based advertising which enables many online services 
to be provided at no financial cost to users. Any changes to the current set-up will therefore have to balance 
the internet users’ right to privacy with the online providers’ commercial objectives and the internet users’ 
interest in being able to obtain online services at low or no cost. However, the ‘loss-of-revenue’ argument 
must be seen as only one of the elements that should be taken into account when deciding on the level of 
regulation required in this context. In particular, it should not, of itself, be used to justify the continued and 
unchecked right of online services to base their revenue models on such a privacy-intrusive technology. To 
do so would not only mean that the government values the interests of businesses in revenue generation 
above the interests of consumers. It would also provide online providers with no incentive to develop other, 
less privacy-intrusive means of generating income from the services they offer. Consumers will often be 
willing, out of a lack of knowledge or because they are in an inferior bargaining position, to agree to 
contractual provisions which ultimately harm their interests. This problem has been recognised and much of 
consumer protection legislation is aimed at preventing sellers and service providers from exploiting this 
situation by prohibiting the inclusion of certain provisions in consumer contracts. There is no reason, why 
similar considerations should not play a part when looking at internet users’ ability or willingness to protect 
their own privacy, given that many users will not be able properly to evaluate the full consequences of the 
decisions they are making (or, in the case of default settings, they are choosing not to make).
An interpretation of the revised Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy Directive which allows providers to continue to 
benefit from users’ failure to read privacy policies and from their inertia when it comes to changing default 
browser settings is therefore unlikely to fulfil the spirit of the amendments to Article 5(3) of the ePrivacy 
Directive even where it pretends to comply with its letter. The revised provision was never aimed at 
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improving the information provided to users about their use of cookies. Rather, it was intended to address 
issues of user inertia and lack of bargaining power by ensuring that providers will not be able to store cookies 
on users’ equipment in the first place unless they have obtained users’ voluntary, specific and informed 
consent. As the Article 29 Working Party has pointed out, such consent cannot be obtained through the use 
of default browser settings which do not require any active input from the user to allow the provider to store 
cookies.
Browser-control-resistant identifiers (‘Flash cookies’ 
and similar)
In addition, the use of browser settings is unlikely to address the problems created through the use of 
identifiers (including user agents, add-ons, plug-ins and other cookie type data collection tools) that cannot 
currently be blocked by the privacy and security settings of most commercial browsers. These identifiers are 
often known as ‘flash cookies’ after a plug-in of the Adobe Flash software. Experience has shown that these 
browser-control-resistant identifiers are more and more widely used, particularly for the purpose of tracking 
user behaviour. [19]
It is clear that the use of browser settings to obtain user consent that is envisaged in Recital 66 of 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive is unworkable in relation to browser-control-resistant identifiers. Although users 
of such identifiers might argue that an internet user’s consent to accept cookies - as expressed through his 
browser settings - should also permit the storage of those identifiers, from the user’s perspective, this 
expectation is unreasonable. A device that will not be affected by a clear user choice to block it, should not 
be able to benefit from a general user choice to ‘accept cookies’ which will often be made without the user 
even being aware of the existence of such browser-control-resistant agents.
As current technology is incapable of dealing with these identifiers, regulatory or self-regulatory intervention 
may be necessary to achieve the policy objective set out in Article 5(3) of the revised ePrivacy Directive. 
Although it is likely that personal data collected by those agents will always be collected in contravention of 
the Data Protection Act 1998 and the ePrivacy Regulations (unless those who use those agents obtain 
consent by other means), detection of the use of those agents is difficult and time-consuming. In practice, it 
will therefore be almost impossible for the Information Commissioner’s Office to enforce the law against 
everyone who uses browser-control-resistant identifiers to collect personal data in contravention of the user’s 
browser settings.
‘Zombie cookies’
In addition, many browser-control-resistant identifiers have the ability to reinstate (‘re-spawn’) traditional 
cookies connected to them even after the user deleted those traditional cookies. Because of this ability ‘to 
bring back the dead’ they are often known as ‘zombie cookies’. This is a deceptive practice, which clearly 
contravenes user choice and which circumvents existing browser technology. The government’s proposals 
set out in the consultation document and the impact assessment would have no effect on the continued use 
of this technology.
Legal certainty and European harmonisation
Because of the global nature of the internet, online providers and online advertising providers are likely to 
use cookies to gather data about internet users from countries other than the one(s) in which they are 
situated and with whose laws they are obliged to comply. Although UK providers may seek to rely on the 
country-of-origin principle set out in Art. 4(1) and (2) of the E-commerce Directive (2000/31/EC), the 
processing of personal data collected online from consumers may be seen as falling within the consumer 
protection derogation contained in Article 4(4) of that Directive.
In addition, the Article 29 Working Party has made it clear in its ‘Working document on determining the 
international application of EU data protection law to personal data processing on the Internet by non-EU 
based web sites’ ‘that the national law of the [m]ember [s]tate where [a] user’s personal computer is located 
applies to the question under what conditions his personal data may be collected by placing cookies on his 
6
European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2012
hard disk’. [20] [21] In practice, this means that a UK online provider that uses cookies to collect personal 
data from users based in another EU member state may be subject to enforcement action being taken 
against it by the relevant authorities in that member state if the providers’ means of collecting that data does 
not comply with that member state’s data protection regime as interpreted by that state’s national regulator.
Consequently, providers situated in the UK will not be able to rely on, or benefit from, the relaxed approach 
outlined in the government’s preferred option (Option 2), if they wish to offer goods and service to customers 
in other EU member states where a more restrictive interpretation of the Directive’s provisions may apply. As 
a result, providers may prefer a slightly more restrictive interpretation of the ways in which they can achieve 
compliance with the requirements of Article 5(3) as amended provided that this interpretation represents a 
harmonised approach across all EU member states which would allow providers to trade freely across EU 
borders without having to invest time, money and expertise in achieving compliance with the requirements of 
different legal systems.
Conclusions
The government should therefore refrain from trying to address the problems raised by the use of cookies in 
general, and by the new provisions inserted into the ePrivacy Directive in particular, in isolation. Instead, the 
UK government should actively engage in a discussion with representatives from other EU member states 
(for example through the Article 29 Working Party) and the European Commission to develop EU-wide, 
harmonised guidance on the steps to be taken by online providers, online advertising providers and browser 
providers to comply with the new provisions. In these discussions, the government should promote a 
pragmatic, but balanced approach which takes into account internet users’ fundamental right to privacy and 
convenience of use of online services as well as the providers’ commercial interests and their need for 
harmonisation and legal certainty. In particular, the UK should aim to ensure that:
1. the new provisions are interpreted in a way which ensures that users’ decision to change browser 
settings to ‘accept cookies’ will be accepted as their express consent to providers’ processing of the 
information transmitted by those cookies across all EU member states;
2. providers, including providers of third party cookies, will be required to provide clear, comprehensive 
and fully visible information about their processing activities;
3. providers will not be permitted solely to rely on default browser settings to ‘accept cookies’. If 
providers wish to rely on an expression of user consent through browser settings, browser owners 
must agree to change their settings to a more privacy-friendly default setting. This need not mean 
that all browsers should reject all cookies by default unless the internet user changes those settings. 
As the Impact Assessment accompanying the consultation paper clearly recognises, many users 
value the ease and convenience that is facilitated through providers’ use of cookies for session 
management, personalisation and recognition. However, the use of cookies for tracking users’ 
behaviour is much more controversial, and while some users might welcome the ‘targeted 
advertising’ that results from the collection of behavioural data by such cookies, the majority of users 
are likely to object to the use of their data for this purpose. In any case, as shown above, the use of 
tracking cookies raises much more substantial consumer protection issues than are currently 
addressed in the Impact Assessment so that even if a majority of users were willing to accept 
tracking cookies, this should not be the only consideration taken into account when making this 
policy decision. One way of addressing the substantive differences between session 
management/personalisation cookies and tracking cookies might be to require browser owners to 
provide for more sophisticated browser settings which allow users to distinguish between the 
different purposes for which cookies may be used. From a user’s point of view it might then be 
acceptable if cookies used for the purpose of session management, personalisation and recognition 
are accepted by default (subject to the user’s ability to change those default settings), whereas 
tracking cookies should be rejected unless the user specifically requires them to be used.
4. it should be made clear that the procedure for obtaining consent set out in Recital 66 does not apply 
to browser-control-resistant identifiers. Ideally, manufacturers of those agents should be encouraged 
to re-configure them in a way that allows internet users to control their use via browser settings. 
Where this is not possible, it should be made clear that the use of browser-control-resistant 
identifiers to collect personal data and to track internet user behaviour is subject to obtaining the 
user’s express consent (for example, via a tick box or a pop-up window).
5. re-spawning traditional cookies after they have been deleted by users should be prohibited by law.
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6. the national regulator should be given appropriate resources to enforce the existing legal provisions 
against providers who are in breach of the ban on the use of ‘re-spawning’ devices and who use 
browser-control-resistant identifiers with obtaining the user’s express consent. Individual data 
subjects as well as consumer protection organisations should be provided with enforceable remedies 
against those providers.
7. while browser owners might be expected to bear the cost of the necessary changes to their default 
settings, the onus to provide users with sufficient information about the effect of those settings and 
the way in which they may be changed should be on the online provider that wants to use cookies. 
The government’s assumption expressed in the impact assessment, that the cost of providing 
information about how to change browser settings on cookies should be borne by browser owners is 
curious given that browser owners do not benefit from the storage of cookies in any way and will not 
be considered data controllers in respect of the information gathered by cookies. It is the online 
providers who will be responsible for the storing of the cookie on the user’s equipment, for the 
collection of the user’s data and for the further processing of that data for the provider’s commercial 
purposes. As data controllers, it is therefore reasonable to expect online providers to provide users 
with the necessary information and to bear the cost of providing that information.
Impact Assessments and Equality Impact Assessment
Question 14
The Government invites views and comments from respondents on the impact assessments and equality 
impact assessment which have been produced to support implementation of the revised electronic 
communications Framework.
New information provision requirements (IA No: 
BIS0109)
In Impact Assessment Number BIS0109, the government proposes to insert a new requirement on providers 
of providers of publicly available electronic communications services ‘to have a procedure in place to be able 
to respond to request for information from the police or security services’ in the Regulations intended to 
implement the amendments to the ePrivacy Directive in the UK. The decision to introduce such an obligation 
is surprising given that:
• the government fails to mention this proposal in the Consultation Paper to which the Impact 
Assessment relates. This runs the risk that it may be overlooked by many respondents to the 
consultation and that the proposal will not receive the public scrutiny it deserves;
• it is not mandated in any way by the provisions of the Citizen’s Rights Directive that the current 
legislative proposal is designed to transpose but is included in addition to those provisions. This 
approach is in stark contrast to the government’s own promise in the context of this consultation 
paper, that it ‘will be implementing the amendments associated with the revised Framework ... in a 
proportionate manner to achieve the desired outcomes without gold-plating’. [22]
The introduction of such an obligation in the context of this consultation is undesirable for a number of 
reasons:
1. Provisions regulating access by public authorities to information held by communication service 
providers (usually communications/traffic data and intercepted electronic communications) are 
already included in the Acquisition and Disclosure of Communications Data Code of Practice and the 
Interception of Communications Code of Practice brought into force under section 71 of 
the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2001 (‘RIPA’). They cover in some detail the steps which 
service providers must take in order to assist public authorities in relation to information disclosure 
requests. It therefore questionable whether additional provisions governing the modalities of data 
transfers from communications services providers to public authorities are necessary in practice.
2. While it would be useful to provide the Information Commissioner’s Office with powers of oversight 
over the extent to which public authorities make use of their rights under RIPA to request individuals’ 
personal information from communications service providers, it has generally been accepted that in 
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the UK this power is exercised by the Interception of Communications Commissioner who addresses 
this issue as part of his annual report. Although it has been shown in a different context, that there 
may be gaps between the oversight powers of the Interception of Information Commissioner and the 
Information Commissioner which need to be closed [23] it seems curious that the Information 
Commissioner’s Office should be required to use its already insufficient resources to police the 
establishment of procedural rules designed to facilitate the provision of information over which the 
Information Commissioner lacks jurisdiction. The government should not use the Information 
Commissioner’s Office as an ‘enforcement agent’ for the police and security service whose duties 
include the obligation to ensure that those services can access the information they request in the 
most efficient way.
3. The fact that communications service providers will be expected to bear the costs of establishing the 
relevant procedures contradict the government’s frequently published intentions that it intends to 
minimise the organisational and economical cost of regulatory compliance on business.
If the government feels that the provisions of the existing codes of practice need to be amended or 
supplemented in any way, it would be prudent that proposals for such amendments should be the subject of 
a separate consultation. This is true, in particular, given the controversy that arose when the above codes of 
practice were first published and the impact which the imposition of additional requirements is likely to have, 
both on the commercial (and hence competitive) position of UK communications service providers and the 
rights of individuals to the protection of their personal data. The government should provide a more 
substantive explanation of why it feels that the existing provisions are not sufficient and why it feels that it 
must impose more structured requirements on providers. Oversight of the way in which providers comply 
with their information requirements must be specifically addressed. The government should also make it 
clear whether the proposed new information requirement is designed to allow public authorities the right to 
access personal information which may not currently be covered by any of the existing regulations.
Regard to consumer needs
The proposals made are certainly more attentive to the government’s Code of Practice on Consultation and 
the advice of the Better Regulation Executive than the extraordinary method chosen to consult ‘stakeholders’ 
on RIPA amendments to assuage the European Commission after the PHORM debacle. [24] The authors 
strongly suggest that, for future consultations, the government should improve its consultation practice, 
taking into account consumer needs by degrouping its list of consultees. ‘Interest groups’ currently only 
accounts for business lobbies and a few government funded consumer groups.
The government should add such institutions as the Foundation for Information Policy Research, Privacy 
International, Creative Commons UK and the Open Rights Group - clearly these are expert and consumer-
interest groups whose input would make the government’s consultations more effective, not least because 
they would provide a ‘critical friend’ role that the Communications Consumer Panel claims but does not 
always achieve. A category called ‘Civil Society and Consumer’ would help the government to identify such 
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